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SCIENCE AND EPA DECISION-MAKING 
Robert M. Sussman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two sets of experiences have shaped my perspective on the 
role of science at EPA. First, I have been a practicing lawyer in the 
trenches, representing clients before EPA for twenty-five plus 
years. Second, I was a senior policymaker at EPA, serving as the 
Deputy Administrator, the number two official in the agency, 
during the Clinton Administration. In this capacity, I was at the top 
of the organization trying to understand how all the pieces fit 
together and mediating between the many constituencies who care 
about what EPA does. 
Based on these diverse experiences, I will provide a context on 
EPA as an institution—how EPA was formed, how it grew, and 
how the political climate in which EPA operates has changed over 
time. Then I will focus on the many different types of decisions 
that EPA makes that are science-based and the factors that shape 
those decisions. Because those factors are complex, they are not 
uniform across the agency or even within specific statutes. It is 
very important to understand the complexity of the decision-
making framework that EPA implements. Finally, I will discuss 
the intense debate that has occurred and is continuing about the 
quality and credibility of EPA science. This debate has been 
underway since the inception of the agency but has been 
particularly emotional and polarized over the last ten years. 
                                                          
 * Robert M. Sussman is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Latham 
& Watkins. He is a graduate of Yale College (1969) and Yale Law School 
(1973). He was Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency during 1993-1994. 
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Mike Friedman commented that FDA has a highly 
professional, dedicated, and unbiased cadre of scientists and that 
by and large FDA’s scientific decisions have a high degree of 
legitimacy.1 This is not the common perception of EPA and its 
scientists, who are typically challenged and attacked on all sides.2 I 
submit, however, that many of the criticisms of EPA science are 
really criticisms of the policy judgments that EPA makes, often in 
response to the direction it has received from Congress. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
EPA is now thirty-three years old. President Nixon presided 
over the creation of the Agency in 1970.3 Thirty-three years, of 
course, is a very long time in the life of an institution. Many of us 
forget that in 1970 there was a flush of public enthusiasm for 
environmental protection. Earth Day 1970 was one of the great 
populist events in postwar America. It brought out hundreds of 
thousands of people to celebrate the environment and call for its 
protection. It was in that heady atmosphere that EPA was born.4 
Early on EPA addressed some environmental needs that all of us 
would agree were obvious. For example, EPA required tail pipe 
emission controls on automobiles.5 It is remarkable, but before 
1970 automobile emissions were unregulated, a situation which, by 
today’s standards, would be unthinkable. To give another example, 
discharges of sewage and pollutants into the nation’s streams and 
waters by industry and municipalities were largely unregulated as 
well. Again, such a situation is unfathomable today because 
treatment of sewage and industrial wastes is viewed as the 
                                                          
1 See Michael A. Friedman, M.D., What Is the Value of an FDA Approval 
in a Judicial Matter?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 559 (2004).  
2 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, 
Manuals and the Like- Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 
41 DUKE L. J. 1311 (1992). 
3 Jack Lewis, The Birth of the EPA, EPA J. (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter The 
Birth of the EPA], available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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hallmark of a civilized, advanced society. 
In its early days, the public benefits of EPA’s actions were 
tangible and immediate and were widely recognized and 
appreciated.6 This strong public support continued during the 
twenty years after EPA’s creation, when the agency experienced a 
period of remarkable institutional growth and expanding 
jurisdiction driven by virtually non-stop legislative activity. During 
this period, Congress passed and asked EPA to implement a large 
array of statutes such as the Toxic Substances Control Act7, which 
regulates the safety of industrial chemicals, the Superfund law or 
CERCLA8, which provides for the clean-up of contaminated sites, 
and the Community-Right-To-Know Law or EPCRA9, which 
authorizes the reporting of toxic emissions by industrial facilities 
and the development of a national emergency response 
management system. 
Congress gave EPA these new mandates in reaction to 
perceived environmental catastrophes that were well publicized 
and dominated the front page news. For example, concern about 
PCBs, persistent, toxic, ubiquitous chemicals, almost single-
handedly accounted for the enactment of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act.10 DDT, made infamous by Rachel Carson in Silent 
Spring, was the major motivator of the laws that govern pesticides 
in this country.11 Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, became the 
poster-child for contaminated industrial properties and gave birth 
to the Superfund statute.12 And the catastrophic release of methyl 
isocyanate at the Union Carbide facility at Bhopal, India, which 
                                                          
6 The Birth of the EPA, supra note 3. 
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2000). 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-74 (2001). 
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000). 
10 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92. See also Pep Fuller & Thomas O. McGarity, 
Beyond the Dirty Dozen: The Bush Administration’s Cautious Approach to 
Listing new Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Future of the Stockholm 
Convention, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
11 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
12 J. Richard Shotts, Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.: Innocent 
PRPS and Section 107 Claims in the Tenth Circuit, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 
491-92 (2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-74 (2001). 
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killed hundreds of people, led to the creation of a community right-
to-know and emergency response system in this country.13 
One result of the crisis mentality that defined Congress’s 
approach to environmental issues is that there is very little 
consistency across statutes. Each statute is tailored to the 
immediate environmental problem at hand, often without any 
regard to how that environmental problem relates to other 
environmental problems and other programs that EPA implements. 
In contrast to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which is 
the organic statute that guides FDA, there is no organic statute 
within which EPA operates.14  Instead, EPA is subject to numerous 
free-standing, crisis-driven statutes passed at different times and 
for different reasons. These statutes are highly detailed and 
prescriptive. They do not give EPA much discretion to set 
priorities, to rank environmental problems, or to decide what is 
important and what is not. Congress in its wisdom has made those 
decisions in the statutes themselves. 
II.  AN AGENCY UNDER SIEGE 
Since 1990, EPA’s world has changed dramatically. From an 
agency which was on the receiving end of increased resources, 
new statutory mandates, and new problems to address, EPA has 
turned into an agency under siege. The frenetic pace of legislative 
activity on the environment has come virtually to a standstill. 
There is now polarization of opinion about environmental policy 
and therefore basic disagreement about EPA’s mission and 
performance. For example, there is no consensus about whether 
EPA does too much or too little. One can find violently held views 
on both sides of that question.15 Nor is there a consensus on 
                                                          
13 John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural “Reform”: 
In Defense of Environmental Right-To-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 
583 (2003); 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000). 
14 12 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2001). 
15 Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A 
Proposal To Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science By Incorporating 
Daubert Principles Into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9-
11 (2003). 
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whether EPA is an honest broker serving the public interest as 
opposed to the handmaiden of special interests. Finally, there is 
major debate about whether EPA’s decisions are driven by science 
or politics.16 Although EPA science has its defenders, there are 
many cynics who believe that science has very little to do with 
what EPA does and that politics explains most of EPA’s actions. 
As you might expect, one trend that has resulted from this 
absence of consensus is the increasing role of litigation as an 
environmental policy tool.17 Very few EPA actions are not 
challenged in the courts. And litigation is used by everybody. It is 
used by environmental activists who feel EPA has dropped the ball 
and has not done enough to address a problem. It is used by 
members of industry who feel that EPA has done too much or that 
its regulations are excessive or unreasonable. In effect, all the 
constituencies who disagree about EPA’s role and mission 
routinely bring those disagreements to the courts. 
Because we are no longer addressing visible environmental 
problems, the public benefits derived from EPA actions are less 
obvious and more difficult to measure than they were in 1970. For 
this reason, it is easier to disagree about whether we are getting 
value for our money from EPA. Some people would say that 
environmental problems that are not obvious, like global warming, 
are enormously important and will affect the future of the planet. 
Others will argue that concerns about global warming or the 
impact of chemicals on children’s health are based on fear-
mongering or sensationalism and have no basis in fact. Because 
key constituencies often disagree violently about whether many 
environmental problems are real and should be addressed by 
government, numerous EPA decisions are bitterly debated. 
III. KEY EPA DECISIONS BASED ON SCIENCE 
This section provides concrete examples of the science-based 
public health decisions that EPA makes. This list will illustrate that 
EPA has enormous influence on many different sectors of our 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Anthony, supra note 2. 
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society, including industries, state and local governments, and 
individual citizens. EPA sets allowable ambient levels for our 
major air pollutants, which include ozone and particulate matter.19 
It regulates the releases of toxic chemicals from industrial facilities 
of all types, sets emission standards for cars and trucks, determines 
permissible levels of contaminants in drinking water, and sets 
health-based cleanup standards for contaminated sites.20 EPA 
implements a regulatory regime that determines what active 
ingredients can be used in pesticides, how those pesticides can be 
applied, and what sort of labeling those pesticides need to have.21 
EPA reviews all new chemicals before they are introduced into 
commerce. And finally, EPA sets safe exposure levels for widely 
known and distributed environmental toxins like lead, asbestos, 
and radon in homes and schools.22 
Even though all of these decisions are focused on public health 
and have a scientific component, the factors that govern them can 
vary dramatically. The statutes assign different weights to a 
number of key decision criteria. Cost is a good example. Is cost 
important in setting environmental standards, or is it immaterial? 
Another example is the significance of the risk. Is the risk remote 
or widespread or severe? Are these relevant or immaterial factors? 
Yet another example is scientific uncertainty. What if we have 
imperfect information about the chemicals and activities we are 
regulating? Do we err on the side of caution and impose 
restrictions in the face of uncertainty or do we wait for better 
scientific information? What about cost/benefit tradeoffs? How 
important is it that a hazardous industrial chemical plays a critical 
role in producing socially useful products? Should the chemical’s 
utility be weighed against its risks or is that immaterial? And 
finally, what weight do we assign to the cost and availability of 
cleanup technology? Is that a factor that should determine the 
                                                          
19 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-50 (1970). 
20 See The Birth of the EPA, supra note 3. 
21 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Pesticides: Regulating Pesticides, EPA Website, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticidies/regulating/laws.htm#fifra (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
22 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2000). 
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levels of protection that EPA mandates, or should EPA set 
stringent standards that are technology-forcing and push industry 
to develop new pollution control techniques? 
IV. MAJOR REGULATORY PARADIGMS 
Looking across the major EPA statutes, there are four types of 
regulatory paradigms, each of which requires EPA to look at 
different decisional factors when using science to protect public 
health. 
One is what I would call the zero risk paradigm, under which 
EPA seeks to provide assurance that there is no level of risk to 
which the population is exposed. This is the paradigm that is used 
to set ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.23 The 
statute directs that EPA must protect public health with an ample 
margin of safety, and that means that the Agency must provide 
absolute protection and even account for possible unknown or 
uncertain risks.24 
On the other hand, some statutes allow EPA to set standards 
that eliminate significant risks but accept insignificant risks. For 
example, at contaminated sites we do not try to get all of the 
contaminants out of the ground water or the soil. Instead, we try to 
reduce the presence of those contaminants to some public health 
level which we deem insignificant and permit some residual level 
of risk. 
The third paradigm is cost/benefit analysis. Here, EPA looks at 
the risks, determining how large and severe they are and what level 
of certainty surrounds the science, and then examines the economic 
and social impacts of addressing the risks. This is the paradigm 
that EPA uses for industrial chemicals and pesticides. Interestingly, 
it bears some resemblance to the approach FDA applies to 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
The final paradigm involves risk only to a very limited extent 
and instead allows technological achievability and cost to drive 
limits on exposure and release. This is the approach EPA follows 
                                                          
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-50 (2001). 
24 Id. 
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for industrial emissions of toxins, which have to be controlled 
using maximum available control technology. EPA uses the same 
approach to control new air pollution sources and regulate 
discharges of toxic pollutants into waters and streams. 
V. THE QUALITY AND CREDIBILITY OF EPA SCIENCE 
A. Safeguards to protect the Quality of EPA Scientific 
Analysis 
In examining the credibility of EPA science, one must 
understand the safeguards that EPA uses to police the quality of its 
science. Many people do not realize that these safeguards are there, 
or they do not believe that they work very well. But they are in fact 
part of a well-established framework for applying science in the 
EPA decision-making process. 
First, EPA follows the principle that risk assessment and risk 
management are separate activities that should be conducted by 
separate parts of the agency and insulated from each other. The 
concept here is that the experts should interpret the science in a 
policy vacuum, and then the science should be handed over to the 
policy makers who decide what the law requires and balance 
scientific and other factors to arrive at the best decision. EPA is 
structured to maintain this wall between risk assessment and risk 
management. Whether that wall really exists in practice is open to 
debate and discussion, but the wall is there. 
Second, EPA has developed detailed risk assessment 
guidelines, which address major health and environmental end-
points. These guidelines, which undergo a rigorous public 
comment process, are agency-wide and are intended to assure 
scientific consistency and transparency across the agency and to 
reflect the consensus of the scientific community on the key issues 
of methodology and interpretation that EPA scientists grapple 
with. 
Third, there is an extensive peer review program within EPA. 
This program does not apply to all regulations issued by EPA and 
the level of peer review varies from one agency action to another, 
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but the scientific basis for most major decisions is scrutinized 
closely, often by EPA’s Science Advisory Board, which is 
comprised of independent scientists from outside the agency 
chosen for their expertise and their scientific accomplishments. 
Finally, safeguards against arbitrary or biased science reside in 
the administrative process for major EPA decisions and, 
ultimately, in the judiciary. Rulemaking at EPA, and at other 
agencies like FDA, is a large undertaking. The players in the 
rulemaking process are very sophisticated. A considerable body of 
scientific information and analysis is submitted by commenters. As 
a result, the scientific differences are framed starkly for EPA 
decision-makers and a full record is created during the 
administrative process which crystallizes the areas of scientific 
dispute. Judicial review is not only very common for most 
decisions that EPA makes, but over the years it has become more 
probing. This is not to say that courts do not defer to the agency. 
They do. Nor is it to say that courts do not recognize that they 
should not substitute their judgment and expertise for EPA’s. They 
do. But, having said that, the judges, particularly in the D.C. 
Circuit, apply a very high level of scrutiny to EPA actions.25 They 
comb through the record diligently and look for scientific 
judgments which ignore the evidence or seem arbitrary. And if 
they find these errors, they do not hesitate to strike down EPA 
action. 
EPA wins some of the major cases it defends, but it loses a fair 
number as well. To point to a big win for EPA, the new air quality 
standards for particulate matter and ozone were ultimately upheld 
in two separate decisions by the D.C. Circuit after being reviewed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.26 When the dust settled, an issue that 
had been battled in Congress, before the agency, and within the 
scientific community for years was put to rest. The Bush 
Administration is now embracing the new standards and focusing 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Assoc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 28 F.3d 1259, 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 167 F.3d 658, (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
26 Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Browner, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000); Bush 
Administration Revisiting its Easing of Clean-Air Rules, THE SEATTLE TIMES, 
July 26, 2003, at A6. 
SUSSMANMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  12:54 PM 
582 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
on how to implement them. But there are also many cases where 
the courts have not hesitated to hold EPA accountable when it has 
overreached on the science. A good example is the decision of the 
Fifth Circuit that vacated an EPA rule that would have banned the 
manufacture and use of asbestos in this country.27 In that case, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that EPA had not met the statutory 
requirements and that the science was not sufficient to demonstrate 
that asbestos was unreasonably dangerous in all applications.28 As 
a result, that rule, which was many years in the making, was 
voided.29 
B. The Debate about EPA Science 
And yet, with safeguards within EPA to assure the credibility 
of the scientific process and with the further safeguards of notice-
and-comment rulemaking and judicial review, EPA science is still 
under attack from all sides. Here are a few quotes from people who 
have railed against the quality of EPA scientific decisions: Linda 
Greer of the NRDC stated “EPA mismanages the scientific 
function to the point that it can no longer be relied upon to be 
either objective or fair.”30 Rep. Vern Ehlers (R-Mich) stated 
“Members of Congress and the judiciary do not have confidence 
that the agency uses science appropriately in its decisions.”32 In 
addition, the Expert Panel on Role of Science at EPA remarked, 
“EPA science is of uneven quality, and the agency’s policies and 
regulations are frequently perceived as lacking a sound scientific 
                                                          
27 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.1991) (finding 
that Canadian workers, affected by the loss of sales due to the EPA’s ban on 
asbestos, pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act, did not have standing to 
challenge the action because of the Act’s “national emphasis”). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, “Bad Science”, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Vol. 
19, No. 1 at 28 (Jan./Feb. 2002). 
32 Representative Vernon Ehlers, “A Bill to Improve Science at EPA”, THE 
ENVTL. FORUM, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2002). 
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foundation.”33 
What is interesting about these quotes is the diverse sources 
they come from. Linda Greer is a senior scientist at the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, which is one of the leading 
environmental groups in this country and certainly an advocate of 
aggressive environmental regulation. Yet her view of EPA science 
is quite scornful. Vern Ehlers, a Republican member of Congress 
from Michigan, is fairly conservative, although not a rabid right-
winger. His perspective is that Congress and the judiciary have lost 
confidence in the integrity of the agency’s scientific decisions. 
Then in 1992, EPA itself convened a panel of esteemed scientists 
from outside the agency to evaluate its scientific capabilities. The 
verdict rendered by this group was likewise a negative one. In 
addition, it is easy to find statements by industry groups which are 
every bit as strident and critical of EPA science as these quotes 
here.34 
The bottom line is that nobody likes EPA science. Congress 
does not like it, the scientific community does not like it, the 
environmental groups do not like it, and industry certainly does not 
like it. 
What is fueling this deep mistrust of EPA science? One 
possible explanation is that there is a growing belief in our 
societyincluding by policy advocates of all persuasions—that 
regulatory science and, importantly, the scientists who participate 
in making it are not searchers for objective truth, but are carrying 
water for the people who pay the bills. This cynical perspective is 
often applied not only to EPA scientists but to industry scientists 
and even to scientists at academic institutions. It leads to a high 
degree of suspicion of the objectivity of any scientific judgment 
that EPA reaches, even where the underlying basis is clearly 
spelled out in the record and subject to external peer review. 
Another reason for the lack of confidence in EPA science is 
that its decisions are rarely black and white. EPA rarely has 
complete information. Instead, the research and studies it uses for 
                                                          
33 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE 
SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS, THE REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON THE 
ROLE OF SCIENCE AT EPA TO ADMINISTRATOR WILLIAM REILLY (March 1992). 
34 Raul & Dwyer, supra note 15, at 10 (NRC criticism of the EPA). 
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decision-making often have significant gaps. In contrast to FDA, 
EPA generally lacks the ability to prescribe the type of data that it 
wants the industry to develop to support a decision. For a new 
pharmaceutical, FDA always has the option of saying, “the data 
you have given me is not sufficient, it does not answer all the 
questions, go back to the drawing board and do more research.” 
But EPA generally does not control the direction and the timing of 
the research that is done on environmental problems. This research 
is performed by government laboratories, academia, or industry for 
reasons largely unrelated to EPA’s needs. EPA is then forced to 
take the data set as it finds it. The result is that EPA is constantly 
wrestling with uncertainty in the science and deciding how to 
accommodate it. 
Although some might disagree, I would submit that the role of 
uncertainty in decision-making is not a scientific issue. It is a 
policy issue. How one feels about uncertainty really depends on 
how one views the role of precaution in protecting public health 
and whether one believes that regulators should err on the 
conservative side when they have insufficient information or 
should instead wait for conclusive proof before taking action. 
Groups in our society have very different views on this 
fundamental question. 
C. Policy Choices in the Risk Assessment Process 
Because there is uncertainty in the science, EPA has to make 
many choices in the risk assessment process. These are only in part 
scientific choices. Instead, they are largely policy judgments. The 
following are examples of these policy judgments. 
In contrast to pharmaceuticals, where we rely on clinical trials 
to make judgments about safety, we do not have extensive human 
epidemiological data on the effects of the chemicals in our society. 
Therefore, many of the safety decisions we make on chemicals are 
based on animal studies and the extrapolation of the results of 
these studies to humans, who are different organisms from rats and 
mice. Moreover, the animal studies used to assess chemicals can 
have conflicting results so it is necessary to decide which study to 
rely on and which study is of lesser weight in the risk assessment 
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process. In determining the implications of animal data for 
humans, relative levels of exposure often raise important issues. 
Animal studies are typically conducted at very high doses with the 
intent of producing an adverse effect that is observable and 
measurable, but people are often exposed to doses that are many 
orders of magnitude lower. Do we assume that the same effects 
occur in humans at low levels of exposure that are observed in 
animals at high doses or, instead, do we assume that there are 
threshold doses below which chemicals will not produce any 
harm? 
If we do conclude that there is some likelihood of adverse 
effects in humans, how do we determine whether the level of risk 
is significant or insignificant? This is a particularly important issue 
for chemicals that are suspected of being carcinogenic. For these 
chemicals, the common technique of regulators, not only at EPA 
but at FDA, is to express the probability of a carcinogenic event in 
statistical terms. In other words, is the risk of cancer 1 in 10,000, 1 
in 100,000, 1 in 1 million, or 1 in 10 million? At what point do you 
decide that the level of risk is too small to warrant action? Does it 
depend on whether people are exposed to the risk voluntarily or 
involuntarily? Does it depend, for example, on the size of the 
exposed population? Is it important that, for a certain chemical, 
only 1,000 people are exposed in the workplace, whereas the entire 
U.S. population may be exposed to other chemicals as a result of 
the widespread use of consumer products? And finally, do you 
consider the level of confidence that the chemical is a carcinogen 
to begin with? If the strength of the evidence is weak, does that 
mean that the Agency will tolerate a level of statistical risk which 
it would not tolerate where the evidence is strong? 
A related issue that EPA grapples with is whether to apply 
safety factors to account for uncertainty in the risk assessment 
process. Because it does not know, for example, whether animal 
data is relevant to humans and to what extent, and what the 
variability of response is within the human population, should the 
Agency add safety factors to its calculation of acceptable levels of 
exposure to account for the uncertainty? And what should those 
safety factors be? For example, there are some chemicals for which 
EPA applies a safety factor of 10,000, which is huge. That means 
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that the safe level is many orders of magnitude below the level at 
which a chemical has exhibited adverse effects. The safe level is 
set at such a low level because we are uncertain about the 
chemical’s properties and we want to be conservative and 
protective. 
These examples are important because they illustrate the point 
that policy choices are a major component of risk assessment, and 
when people are debating the quality of EPA science, they are 
really debating the policy choices EPA makes in interpreting 
scientific data, not what the science itself is saying, which in many 
cases may be uncontroversial. 
 
VI. EPA SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
The following are a few tips on what judges should look for 
when an EPA science decision comes before them in the 
courtroom. First, make sure you understand the factors that 
Congress directed EPA to apply in making the decision. That 
means going back to the statutory underpinnings of the decision to 
understand what type of judgment Congress was interested in and 
what factors Congress said were important. Second, you should 
differentiate clearly between science and policy judgments and 
make sure you understand what portions of an EPA decision are 
science-based in the narrow sense, and what portions are based on 
policy considerations. Third, you should recognize the role of 
uncertainty in the decision that EPA has made and try to 
understand the assumptions that EPA has made to deal with that 
uncertainty. Fourth, make sure you understand the level of public 
comment and peer review that has been applied during the EPA 
decision-making process. There is a very big difference between an 
EPA standard which has undergone full and careful review by the 
agency’s Science Advisory Board and an EPA standard which has 
not undergone any external review at all. And the final point, 
which is obvious but always worth repeating, is that the safe levels 
that EPA sets are designed for overall protection of the population, 
not to prevent harm in any individual case. Thus, the mere fact that 
an EPA standard has been violated does not establish causation in 
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a case where a product, emission, or waste is the alleged cause of 
injury. Violation of a standard may mean that there is an increased 
risk of injury, but that increased risk may or may not be relevant to 
an individual plaintiff compared to many other factors that could 
be at play. Thus, the significance of an EPA standard is a case-
specific decision; the EPA science can inform that decision, but it 
is not going to eliminate the need for the court or jury to exercise 
judgment under the facts of each case. 
 
 
